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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs/Appellants Charlie W. Harrison and Trena Harrison (the
“Harrisons”) appeal from the final Order and Judgment by the Seventh Judicial
District Court for Grand County, State of Utah, quieting title, in Defendants/
Appellees Spah Family, Ltd., Stan Holland and Page Holland (collectively the
“Hollands”), to a 40-foot-wide easement by prescription across land owned by the
Harrisons. The Order and Judgment, entered June 11, 2018, incorporate the trial
court’s July 28, 2017 summary judgment ruling that, as a matter of law, the
Hollands had satisfied all elements of an easement by prescription across the
Harrisons’ property—the only issue for trial to the jury being the location and
scope of the easement.1 A copy of the court’s June 11, 2018 Order and Judgment
(R. 1285-89) is included in the Appendix as Attachment 1; a copy of the court’s
July 28, 2017 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment (R. 521-24) is included in
the Appendix as Attachment 2.
The facts before the trial court, however, demonstrated that the Hollands’
claim to a prescriptive easement fails. The Hollands’ use of the road across the
Harrisons’ property was not open, adverse and uninterrupted for the prescriptive
period. Use was initially permissive, and never shown to have become adverse.
1

The Hollands also asserted a claim for damage to two gates on their property. The jury
returned a verdict of only $300 on this claim, and no appeal was taken therefrom.
6
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Before the 20-year prescriptive period expired, the Harrisons challenged the
Hollands’ use of the road and summoned law enforcement to prevent them from
using the road.
Even if the Hollands were able to demonstrate prescriptive use by clear and
convincing evidence, they offered no competent evidence of its historic course and
scope. Due to improper instruction though, the jury imposed a 40-foot easement
on the Harrisons’ property along a centerline established by a 2016 survey of the
road existing at that time – a burden on the Harrison property which had never
existed. In fact, the width of the historical use of the road was 8 feet.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should remand this case for entry of
judgment in favor of the Harrisons, or for a retrial.
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS FOR APPEAL
This is an appeal from final orders and the judgment of the Seventh Judicial
District Court for Grand County. The Utah Supreme Court retained jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in ruling on summary judgment that the

Hollands had met all the elements necessary to establish an easement by
prescription and specifically, whether the Hollands made continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted use of the Harrisons’ property for a period of 20 years or more, even
7
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though the Harrisons summoned law enforcement which interrupted the
prescriptive period and caused a revocation of the Harrisons’ acquiescence.
(Preserved at R. 262-281, 564-576, 604-610, 1320-1368, 1389.) Review of orders
granting summary judgment are reviewed for correctness, affording no deference
to the trial court’s ruling. Federal Capital Corp. v. Libby, 2016 UT 41, ¶ 7, 384
P.3d 221. All facts and resulting inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Robinson v. Jones Waldo Holbrook
& McDonough, PC, 2016 UT App 34, ¶ 11, 369 P.3d 119.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in holding, as a matter of law on

summary judgment, that the Hollands’ use of the Harrisons’ property was adverse,
even though their predecessors-in-interest used the road with the express
permission from the developer for a limited purpose, and even though no
conversion to an adverse use was shown. (Preserved at R. 262-281, 564-576, 604610, 1320-1368.) Review of orders granting summary judgment are reviewed for
correctness, affording no deference to the trial court’s ruling. Libby, 2016 UT 41,
¶ 7. All facts and resulting inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Robinson, 2016 UT App 34, ¶ 11.
3.

Whether the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury that the

course and scope of the prescriptive easement is measured and limited by the
historic use thereof. (Preserved at R. 930, 1748-1750.) Jury instructions, being

8
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statements of applicable law, are reviewed for correctness, affording the trial court
no deference. Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 14, 29 P.3d 638; Child v. Gonda,
972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998).
4.

Whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence from the

Hollands’ retained expert, Lucas Blake, that the centerline of the easement by
prescription could be estimated by using the centerline of the broadened and
altered roadway as it existed in 2016. (Preserved at R. 690-700, 811-820.) A trial
court’s decision on the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 10, 137 P.3d 726.
5.

Whether the trial court improperly excluded rebuttal evidence from

the Harrisons’ retained expert, Bradley Bunker, regarding the shortcomings of the
survey prepared by Lucas Blake, notwithstanding Mr. Blake’s failure to (1) consult
historic data concerning use of the roadway crossing the Harrisons’ property at any
time before the autumn of 2016, and (2) locate a centerline of the roadway from
historic data rather than from measuring to the centerline of the road existing in
2016, which had been widened by the Hollands at that time. (Preserved at
R. 1821-1823, 1827-1834.2) A trial court’s decision to exclude expert testimony is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ¶ 10.

2

The Approved Statement of Proceedings as to Which Transcript is Unavailable, issued
January 10, 2019, is included in the Appendix as Attachment 3. This Court granted the
9
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts and Marshaling of Evidence 3
A.

Property Ownership
1.

The Harrisons are owners in fee simple of a parcel of real property

located at 639 Spotlight Hollow Road, Castle Valley, Utah, more particularly
described as follows:
SE1/4NE1/4SW1/4, LESS the West 66.0 feet of the
SE1/4NE1/4SW1/4, Section 35, T25S, R24E, SLBM. (Also known as
Parcel “H” on the plat recorded as an attachment to the Restrictive
Covenants recorded 11/17/1994 in Book 470 at Page 244.)
TOGETHER with a right-of-way for ingress and egress over an
existing road across the N1/2SW1/4 OF Section 35, T25S R24E,
SLBM, said road runs from the N line of the N1/2SW1/4 to the S line
of the N1/2 SW1/4 and provides access to the S1/2SW1/4 of Section
35, T25S, R24E, SLM
TOGETHER with a 20 foot easement on the North boundary of Parcel
G and any other access rights which may (sic) established by the Plat
recorded as an attachment to the Restrictive Covenants recorded
11/17/1994 in Book 470 at Page 244.
Amended Complaint, ¶ 10 (R. 10); Answer and Counterclaim, ¶ 2 (R. 19).
The Harrisons’ property was designated Parcel H on the plat map of a subdivision
known as Willow Basin Subdivision, created by Janice Hawley incident to
Harrisons’ motion to supplement the record, filed pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, on February 6, 2019. See Order.
3

The majority of the Harrisons’ assignments of error herein go to the court’s rulings on
dispositive motions and improper instruction of the jury, which, as noted above, are
reviewable for correctness. Nevertheless, the Harrisons include herewith a marshaling of
all evidence supporting the judgment below, to the extent presented at trial.
10
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Restrictive Covenants recorded November 17, 1994 as Entry No. 432742,
Book 470, Page 244, Grand County Recorder’s Office. (R. 48, 186.)
2.

On May 23, 2008, the Harrisons took title to Parcel H by Warranty

Deed from Janice Hawley, which was recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s
Officer as Entry No. 486320, Book 728, Page 588. Amended Complaint, ¶ 14 (R.
12); Answer and Counterclaim, ¶ 1 (R. 19).
3.

Defendant/Appellee SPAH Family, Ltd. Partnership (“SPAH”) holds

title to a parcel of land immediately to the north of Parcel H, more particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at the Center 1/4 Corner of Section 35, Township 25 South,
Range 24 East, SLB&M, and proceeding thence with the Center 1/4
line South 0 10' East 661.0 feet to a Corner, thence North 89 51'
West 589.0 feet to a Corner, thence North 0 05' West 660.9 feet to a
Corner, thence with the Center 1/4 line South 89 51' East 588.0 feet
to the point of beginning, Grand County, Utah.
TOGETHER with a non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress
20.0 feet on each side of the following described centerline:
BEGINNING at a point which bears South 86 34' East 1938.0 feet
from the West 1/4 Corner Section 35, T25S, R24E, SLB&M, and
proceeding thence with said centerline South 45 00' East 161.2 feet,
thence South 0 05' East 436.2 feet to the terminus of this centerline
description.
SUBJECT to a non-exclusive easement over and across the West 40.0
feet and also a 10 foot wide access easement to a spring that extends
Northerly to the Northwesterly area from the roadway.
Subject to all restrictions, easements, and rights-of-way, however
evidenced.
11
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(R. 406-07.) On October 17, 1997, SPAH took title to the above-described
property (designated on the official plat of Willow Basin Subdivision as
“Parcel A”), by Special Warranty Deed from Stan Holland and Page Holland,
which was recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 442633,
Book 509, Pages 427-428. Deposition of Stan Holland (“Holland Depo”) at 13:1525 (R. 377) & Special Warranty Deed, attached to the Holland Depo as Exhibit 5
(R. 406-07).
4.

Stan Holland and Page Holland had previously taken title to Parcel A

by Warranty Deed from Manuel Torres and Ginger Torres dated August 9, 1996,
recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 437364, Book 490,
Page 83. Holland Depo at 10:4-11 (R. 376) & Warranty Deed, attached to the
Holland Depo as Exhibit 4 (R. 405).
5.

Manuel Torres and Ginger Torres, the Hollands’ grantors, obtained

title to Parcel H from Janice Hawley by Warranty Deed dated February 22, 1996,
recorded in the Grand County Recorder’s Office as Entry No. 436016, Book 484,
Page 103. Counterclaim, ¶ 8 (R. 21) & Warranty Deed (R. 50).
6.

The relative positions of Parcels A and H in the Willow Basin

Subdivision, together with illustrated easements, are shown on the plat map below:

12
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B.

Permissive Use
6.

Janice Hawley was the original owner of all property within Willow

Basin subdivision. Declaration of Janice Kirk Gustafson (formerly Janice Hawley)
(“Hawley Decl.”), ¶ 2 (R. 309).

13
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7.

In November of 1994 Keogh Land Surveying prepared a subdivision

plat of Willow Basin subdivision at Janice Hawley’s request. Hawley Decl., ¶ 3
(R. 310).
8.

As illustrated by the above survey, the subdivision consisted of eight

lots, each accessible by roads drawn within the subdivision, all as reflected on the
recorded subdivision plat. Id., ¶ 4 (R. 310).
9.

It was always Ms. Hawley’s intention that the lots within the

subdivision be accessed by the road shown on the plat map. Hawley Decl., ¶ 5 (R.
310).
10.

After all necessary government agencies had approved the Willow

Basin subdivision, Janice Hawley retained Randy Day and Raymond Tibbets of
Canyon Country Realty to list and market the lots. Id., ¶ 6 (R. 310).
11.

Janice Hawley then entered into an agreement with Manuel and

Ginger Torres, under which she conveyed all of her right, title and interest in and to
Parcel A of the subdivision to the Torreses in exchange for Manuel Torres’
construction of a cabin for her on Parcel G, a property which she had retained. Id.,
¶ 7 (R. 310).
12.

Ms. Hawley then became aware that, at some time before or after the

summer of 1996, Canyon Country Realty or Keogh Land Surveying arranged for
the grading of a narrow road connecting Parcel A with adjacent public roads by

14
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means of a road looping over a portion of Parcel H, title to which she had retained.
Id., ¶ 8 (R. 310).
13.

It was Ms. Hawley’s understanding that the purpose of the road

crossing Parcel H was not a permanent access to Parcel A, but a means of
permitting the Torreses to take prospective purchasers to Parcel A for marketing the
other parcels. Id., ¶ 9 (R. 310).
14.

While Ms. Hawley neither knew of nor authorized the creation of the

road in advance, its use thereafter was for the purposes stated above, and was
pursuant to permission from her. Id., ¶ 10 (R. 311).
15.

Randy Day of Canyon Country Realty recalled that the road was used

by him and his company, with Janice Hawley’s express permission. Deposition of
Randy Day (“Day Depo”) at 19:3-5; 32:19-33:25; 20:6 (R. 330, 333) & Exhibit 1
(R. 402).
C.

Interruption of Consent to Use
16.

The Hollands were not aware that there was property available for

sale within the Willow Basin subdivision until shortly before August 9, 1996, the
date on which they acquired title to Parcel A. Holland Depo at 10:12-23 (R. 376).
The Hollands’ alleged prescriptive use of any portion of the Harrisons’ property,
therefore, did not commence until August 9, 1996 or later. Id.

15
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17.

Charlie Harrison notified Stan Holland, well before August 2016 that

he forbade the Hollands’ use of the road across Parcel H as a means to access
Parcel A. Charlie Harrison Declaration (“Harrison Decl.”), ¶ 11 (R. 304).
18.

Moreover, Page Holland contacted the Sheriff’s Office on

September 20, 2016 to report that Charlie Harrison “parked a Dozer in the
driveway of the access road blocking their property.” Sheriff’s Report, p. 2 (R.
584).
19.

The Sheriff’s Report included a Voluntary Statement form, filled out

by hand by Page Holland and signed under oath. See Sheriff’s Report, pp. 4-10 (R.
586-92). The Voluntary Statement form contains the following representation by
Defendant Page Holland, concerning, among other things, events in June of 2016:
Father’s Day weekend (June 17, 18 or 19) Charlie Harrison and Stan
Holland (my husband) argued about rights to an access road in
Willow Basin. Deputy Black called out – talked to both parties. We
received a written letter dated August 18 from Charlie Harrison’s
attorney (Jessica Wilde, Jones, Waldo & Holbrook) stating we had no
right to use the small portion of the road accessing our cabin.
Sheriff’s Report, Voluntary Statement Form (R. 586); emphasis added.
20.

At trial, the Hollands offered the following evidence concerning the

dispute over their use of the road across the Harrison Property:
a.

The dispute over the Hollands’ use of the road across the

Harrison property commenced in “the summer of 2016.” Trial Record
(“TR”) at 96:15-20 (R. 1521).
16
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b.

It arose on Father’s Day 2016, when the Hollands were

planning a family party on the Holland property. TR at 97:23-98:6 (R. 152223).
21.

At trial the court prohibited the Harrisons’ counsel from inquiring into

the altercation of June 2016 between the parties over the Hollands’ use of the road
across the Harrisons’ property. TR at 144:22-145:13 (R. 1569-70).
D.

Course and Scope of Historic Use
22.

At the time the Hollands acquired their interest in Parcel A in late

1996, the road traversing a portion of Parcel H (apparently placed for access to
power utility poles) was one blade width, or eight feet, in width and, in places, was
impassable without an off-road vehicle. Harrison Decl., ¶ 10 (R. 304); Day Depo
at 18:25-19:2 (R. 290).
23.

At trial, Mr. Day confirmed that at the time the Hollands acquired

Parcel A, the road traversing Parcel H was one blade width, or eight feet, in width.
TR at 229:23-230:30 (R. 1654-55).
24.

At no point before or during trial did the Hollands adduce any

testimony or other evidence whatsoever controverting the 8-foot width of the road
in August of 1996. The Hollands offered only the following:
a.

Page Holland testified that the road across the Harrison

property, as it existed in 1996 when the Hollands acquired their property,

17
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was a narrow, single-lane road, like others in the subdivision – though wide
enough for her to drive a Jeep Cherokee pulling a tent trailer with her
husband following in the pickup truck pulling a horse trailer. TR at 108:11109:12 (R. 1533-34). The Hollands did not measure its width at the time.
TR at 109:2-3 (R. 1534).
b.

Stan Holland confirmed that, at the time the Hollands first

acquired their property, he drove a truck and horse trailer over the road
crossing the Harrison property. TR at 120:20-121:11 (R. 1545-46).
25.

After acquiring their property, the Hollands built a cabin thereon, and

ran construction and cement trucks over the road crossing the Harrison property.
TR at 133:23-134:19 (R. 1558-59).
26.

According to Stan Holland’s trial testimony, the road across the

Harrison property was leveled and widened by Charlie Harrison after the
Harrisons’ acquisition of the Harrison property in 2008. TR at 111:15-22 (R.
1536).
27.

At trial, the Hollands’ retained expert surveyor, Lucas Blake, testified

that:
a.

He was familiar with the Willow Basin Subdivision area

because he had been hired by Page Holland to prepare a survey. TR at
150:14-25 (R. 1575).

18
1493618.4

b.

At Page Holland’s direction, he prepared a survey of the

roadway across the Harrison property – as it existed in 2016 – which was
introduced as Exhibit 3. TR at 150:23-151:8 (R. 1575-76).
c.

The survey was prepared by “estimat[ing] the edge of the dirt

road” which they “shot . . . coming up to the property, actually all the way
up to the top . . . .” TR at 152:14-22 (R. 1577).
d.

From this, Mr. Blake prepared a legal description consisting of

the metes and bounds of the existing road at the time the survey was created.
TR at 152:23-153:2 (R. 1577-78).
e.

Mr. Blake could not testify as to a uniform width of the road, it

being wider and narrower in various locations as illustrated on Exhibit 31.
TR at 153:25-154:11 (R. 1578-79).
f.

From his 2016 metes and bounds description, Mr. Blake worked

backward to create a centerline. TR at 154:12-14 (R. 1579).
g.

Page Holland first contacted Mr. Blake to perform the survey in

October of 2016. TR at 156:13-21 (R. 1581).
28.

In cross-examination, Mr. Blake acknowledged the following:
a.

Prior to visiting the property in October of 2016 in response to

Defendant Page Holland’s request, Mr. Blake had never been to the property

19
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(TR at 157:10-12 (R. 1582)); neither had he visited any other Willow Basin
properties (TR at 157:13-15 (R. 1582));
b.

Before preparing the survey admitted as Exhibit 31, Mr. Blake

had done no other survey work on the properties at issue herein (TR at
158:22-25 (R. 1583)); and
c.

In preparing his opinion, Mr. Blake had looked at no other

documents or data indicating what the road might have looked like in years
past, including historic photographs, prior surveys or any information at all
as to where the road went or how large it was in 1996 (TR at 159:5-16 (R.
1584)).
Procedural History
The Harrisons filed this action before the Seventh Judicial District Court for
Grand County, State of Utah, on September 15, 2016. In their Complaint the
Harrisons sought a declaration that they were the owners of an express easement of
access over property owned by the Hollands and servicing the Harrisons’ property
(owned to the south of the Holland property); they also sought a declaration that
they owned their own property free and clear of any claim of right, title or interest

20
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(including prescriptive easement rights) by the Hollands. (R. 1-5.) Finally, they
sought damages and injunctive relief for trespass across their property. (R. 4.)4
The Hollands counterclaimed on September 25, 2016. They sought a
declaration that they held prescriptive easement rights across an existing road on
the Harrisons’ property, for purposes of accessing their property to the north
thereof; the Hollands also sought a declaration that the Harrisons had no rights (or
limited rights) across the express easement passing over the Hollands’ property.
Finally, the Hollands claimed damages to two of their gates that blocked access to
and from both the Hollands’ and Harrisons’ properties. (R. 19-32.)
On April 19, 2017, following completion of fact discovery, the Harrisons
moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that, as a matter of
law, they held express easement rights across the Hollands’ property. (R. 173222.) Shortly thereafter, on April 28, 2017, the Hollands moved for summary
judgment on all claims asserted in their Counterclaim. (R. 223-49.)
A hearing was held on July 11, 2017. (R. 509-11.) By order dated July 28,
2017, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that:
a.

The Harrisons held good and marketable title in and to an

express, nonexclusive easement for access, 40 feet in width, along the
western border of the Hollands’ property, as illustrated on the plat map
4

The Harrisons amended their Complaint on September 23, 2016, to make certain factual
corrections in their claims. (R. 10-16).
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recorded with the restrictive covenants applicable to the Willow Basin
Subdivision on November 17, 1994, and were entitled to make all reasonable
use of that easement for access to and from their own property; and
b.

The Hollands had met all of the necessary elements of a claim

of easement by prescription along all or some portion of the roadway
crossing the Harrisons’ property but that the course, scope or extent of that
easement were issues for trial.
(R. 521-24.) The court denied the remainder of the Hollands’ motion for summary
judgment. (R. 523.) Incident to its ruling, the court held as a matter of law that –
notwithstanding the declaration of Janice Hawley (the developer) that (1) the road
across Harrisons’ property was not included in the subdivision plat as an access
road; (2) the road had been cut for the sole purpose of accessing the Holland
property for marketing purposes; and (3) was being used with her express
permission – the Hollands’ use of that road was not permissive. (R. 521-23; 13721373.)
On October 9, 2017, the Harrisons moved the court to reconsider its
summary judgment order on the Hollands’ claim of easement by prescription
across the Harrisons’ property, noting that newly-uncovered evidence established
that Charlie Harrison had confronted Stan Holland on the use of the road crossing
the Harrisons’ property before the expiration of the 20-year prescriptive period

22
1493618.4

being claimed by Hollands; and further, the Harrisons had summoned law
enforcement to prevent Hollands’ use of the road, but that law enforcement had
declined to intervene. (R. 564-92.) At a scheduling conference held on
November 14, 2017, the court refused even to permit argument on the Harrisons’
motion to reconsider, summarily denying the motion without explanation.
(R. 1389.)
On March 2, 2018, the Harrisons filed a motion in limine to exclude the
expert testimony of Lucas Blake. Mr. Blake, a licensed surveyor, proposed to offer
testimony as to the course and extent of the road crossing the Harrisons’ property
when he first examined it in 2016 – rather than its course and scope during the 20year prescriptive period preceding the filing of this action.5 (R. 690-700.) By
order dated April 5, 2018, the court denied the Harrisons’ motion and in its ruling,
stated the following:
Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine is denied. Plaintiffs have wasted the time
of both the court and opposing counsel with this motion. It is plain
that the purpose of the survey is to provide the court with the legal
description of a pathway on the ground in the event that the evidence
establishes that there is a legal right of way along that pathway. It
has never been necessary – and indeed must not become necessary –
to hire only a surveyor familiar with the historical use of every
centimeter of a claimed easement. Plaintiffs make an elaborate effort
to set up a straw man which they very convincingly – and not
surprisingly – knock down, but all of their arguments completely miss
the point. If defendants establish the existence of a right of way, it
Any prescriptive easement crossing the Harrisons’ property was limited to its historic
use during the prescriptive period. see Argument, Point III.
5
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will then be very useful to the court to have a metes and bounds
description of that right of way so that a judgment can be entered
which reduces the likelihood of future litigation.
(R. 839 (emphasis added).)
A week before trial, on May 7, 2018, the Harrisons submitted their proposed
jury instructions to the court. (R. 896-988.) The Harrisons’ proposed Jury
Instruction No. 31 addressed the historic use of a prescriptive easement:
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT LIMITED TO THAT
REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR HISTORIC USE
A prescriptive easement, if established, is limited by the nature
and extent of its use during the prescriptive period. Stated differently,
the extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its
historic use during the prescriptive period (which, as I previously
stated, is not less than 20 years). SPAH Family Limited and Hollands
must therefore prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the location,
width, course, and use which have been made of their prescriptive
easement over Harrisons’ property for the prescriptive period.
(R. 930.) The Harrisons also proposed Jury Instruction No. 32, dealing with
easement by prescription not being established by permissive use:
EASEMENT BY PRESCRIPTION NOT ESTABLISHED BY
PERMISSIVE USE
As I previously instructed, a claim of prescriptive easement
depends on “adverse use” of the claimed easement for the entire
prescriptive period. If, at any time during the prescriptive period, the
claimant’s use of the property is with permission of the owner, the use
is not “adverse,” and no prescriptive right arises.
However, if the other elements of prescriptive easement had
been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the “adverse” nature
of the use is presumed. The burden then shifts to the property owner
to prove that the use was not “adverse,” but permissive.
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(R. 931.)
The case was tried to the jury on May 14 and 15, 2018. (R. 1049-61, 14261820.) During trial, the court permitted the Hollands’ expert, Lucas Blake, to
testify concerning its survey of the supposed easement across Harrisons’ property.
Mr. Blake presented a survey drawing prepared in anticipation of trial, which
showed the location and contours of the road across the Harrison property as he
examined it, as well as the supposed location and legal description of its centerline.
On cross-examination, however, Mr. Blake acknowledged the following:
a.

That Defendant/Counterclaimant Page Holland first contacted

him in October of 2016 to perform survey work on the Harrison property
(TR at 156:13-21 (R. 1581));
b.

That before that time, he had never seen the property, or entered

into the Willow Basin Subdivision for to view other properties (TR at 157:615 (R. 1582));
c.

That the survey work presented on direct examination

(Exhibit 31) was the result of that 2016 visit (TR at 158:13-16 (R. 1583));
d.

That, in preparation for his testimony, he had never looked at

other documents or any other data to indicate what the road might have
looked like in prior years (TR at 158:22-159:8 (R. 1584));
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e.

That he had never examined any historic photographs or aerials

(TR at 159:9-13 (R. 1584)); and
f.

He had no information concerning the location, configuration or

scope of the road across the Harrison property in 1996 (TR at 159:14-16 (R.
1584)).
On the second day of trial, after Lucas Blake’s testimony, the court excluded
testimony from Brad Bunker, the Harrisons’ retained rebuttal expert. Mr. Bunker
intended to refute Mr. Blake’s survey testimony on the grounds that it did not
measure the historic use of the easement during the prescriptive period. Approved
Statement of Proceedings as to Which Transcript is Unavailable, dated January 10,
2019 (Appendix Attachment 3).6 The lower court rejected the admissibility of this
evidence, observing that “if he really thinks he can do that, he’s intruding into my
domain . . . . And he’s – he’s a friend of mine, I like him, I’ve had him do surveys,
but I would never, never think that that was his responsibility was to decide how
you – how – how a descriptive [sic] easement is determined.” TR at 270:12-19 (R.
1738).
At the conclusion of evidence, the court instructed the jury on law applicable
to prescriptive easements. Incident thereto, the court declined Harrisons’ proposed

6

See supra n. 2.
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Jury Instruction No. 31, and instructed the jury as follows concerning the historic
use of a prescriptive easement:
You should determine what is reasonably necessary, from the facts
and circumstances of this case, for SPAH and the Hollands to access
their property, taking into account the historic use and shape of the
roadway during its 20 years of use. You may express your decision in
terms of the survey, or by determining the width of the easement.
Jury Instruction No. 27 (R. 1085.) The court refused outright to instruct the jury
on the impact of permissive use on the claim of prescriptive easement, declining
the Harrisons’ proposed Jury Instruction No. 32. (Id.)
Following deliberation, the jury returned the special verdict form finding
that the Hollands had established a prescriptive easement a full 40 feet in width
along the course of the road described by the Hollands’ expert surveyor, Lucas
Blake, the jury stating that “this will be consistent with other easements in
subdivision.” (R. 1094.)
The court entered final judgment on the jury’s verdict June 11, 2018.
(R. 1285-90) (Appendix Exhibit 2).
On May 18, 2018, the Hollands filed a motion for costs and attorney’s fees
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825.7 By Order dated June 13, 2018, the trial court
denied the Hollands’ motion and expressed his view of the Harrisons:

7

The Hollands’ motion for attorney’s fees also invoked Rule 73, Utah R. Civ. P.; that
rule, however, merely identifies procedural requirements for seeking an award of
attorney’s fees, and establishes no grounds therefor.
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With respect to the vast majority of what was litigated in this case,
there is no question that plaintiffs were simply asserting, as was their
right, that defendants either had no easement at all, or that the
easement was more narrow than defendants desired. It was obvious
that plaintiffs were being hardnosed, and certainly not very
neighborly. It even seemed to the court that plaintiffs were pursuing a
course that was unlikely to ultimately earn them anything worthwhile
on the legal front, while simultaneously damaging their relationships
and reputations with other cabin owners in the Willow Basin area.
That is, however, their legal right.
...
Plaintiffs may be difficult people, secure, stubborn, and almost
unreasoning in their opinions and legal stances, but the court cannot
go so far as to find that they acted in bad faith, i.e., knowing their
claims would fail or simply to harm defendants. Their ignorance and
lack of regard for the views of others act here as shields to a finding of
bad faith.
(R. 1294.)8

Although the trial court commented that it was the Harrisons’ legal right to pursue their
claims, it appears from the court’s statement that the court carries clear bias against the
Harrisons, regardless of their legal rights and ability to seek relief in a court of law. First,
the prescriptive easement claim was the Hollands’ counterclaim and the Harrisons were
entitled to defend such a claim. Second, the basis to defend such a claim was well-taken,
in good faith, and for the reasons explained herein, the Hollands did not meet by clear
and convincing evidence that they are entitled to the easement awarded (including the
width based on the historic use). Finally, this legal action is not the first time that the
Harrisons, in their view, have not received a fair shake before the trial court. The
Harrisons filed an action against individuals, claiming, in short, that they had conspired to
steal a business that Charlie Harrison had purchased. See Harrison v. Kratz, et al., Case
No. 140700031 (filed August 19, 2014 and dismissed July 13, 2016 after the parties
reached a resolution). After the trial court ruled against the Harrisons on discovery
motions, which inevitably would made it very difficult to move prove their claims (see,
e.g., Case No. 140700031, February 23, 2015 Minutes for Plaintiff Discovery Issues;
April 7, 2015 Minutes for Second Statement of Discovery Issues; May 14, 2015 Order
Regarding Plaintiffs’ Second Statement of Discovery Issues), and they ended up settling
the case. The Court can take judicial notice of the prior lawsuit as a matter of public
8
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In ruling that, as a matter of law, Hollands held prescriptive easement rights
across Harrisons’ property, the court ignored the fact that Hollands failed to
establish that their use had been continuous and uninterrupted for a full 20 years.
Before their 20-year prescriptive period lapsed, the Hollands were confronted with
Charlie Harrison and (later) a county sheriff, summoned by the Harrisons, the
Hollands were notified that their right to cross Harrisons’ property was not
acknowledged or acquiesced in. The Harrisons’ actions in this regard should be
deemed both a revocation of acquiescence in the use of their property as required
by governing law, and as the initiation of “legal action” sufficient to interrupt the
Hollands’ period of prescriptive use.
The Harrisons presented unrefuted evidence, in response to the Hollands’
summary judgment motion, that use of the road across their property was
(1) outside the intended access roads established by the developer on her recorded
plat, (2) created for a specific and limited purpose of access to the Holland parcel
for marketing purposes, and (3) used with her express permission. While
acknowledging that the foregoing established “permissive use” prior to the
record. See Utah R. Evid. 201(b); BMBT, LLC v. Miller, 2014 UT App 64, ¶ 6, 322 P.3d
1172 (a court may take judicial notice of public records); Mel Trimble Real Estate v.
Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (it is within the
appellate court’s discretion to take judicial notice of the prior lawsuit). The Harrisons
respectfully submit to this Court that the trial court did not handle this case and the
Harrison v. Kratz, et al., case fairly and objectively.
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Hollands’ acquisition of the Holland parcel, the trial court ruled as a matter of law
that the change in title of the Holland property converted the “permissive” use to
an “adverse” use. This is contrary to governing law, which has long stated that
once permissive use is shown, the easement claimant must present clear and
convincing evidence of its conversion to an adverse use.
If and when a prescriptive right is established, the scope of that right is
governed and limited by the easement’s historic use. A trier of fact may not
burden the servient estate beyond the scope and extent of the use made of the
easement during the prescriptive period. In instructing the jury in this case,
however, the trial court ignored this standard, instructing the jury that they “should
determine what is reasonably necessary, from the facts and circumstances of this
case, for [Hollands] to access their property . . .” The jury’s express finding, upon
special interrogatories, that the easement across the Harrison’s property should be
40 feet in width – not because such width was historically used during the
prescriptive period, but because the express, platted easements in the subdivision
were of that width – evinces the incorrectness of the court’s instruction in this
regard.
The trial court improperly permitted testimony from the Hollands’ expert
land surveyor, Lucas Blake. Mr. Blake’s opinion testimony, by his own admission,
was limited to measurement of the road across Harrisons’ property as it existed in
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October of 2016 – well after the road had been widened and reconfigured by
Harrisons toward the end of the prescriptive period. Mr. Blake had consulted no
historic photographs, no prior survey work, and no other historical evidence which
would indicate the course or scope of the road crossing Harrisons’ property prior to
2016. Rather, Mr. Blake arrived at his opinion concerning the location and scope
of the easement crossing the Harrisons’ property by locating what he deemed to be
the edges of the road existing in 2016, and “eyeballing” a centerline based thereon.
The Hollands offered no evidence at all of the 8-foot-wide roadway’s location in
1996.
For the same reason, the court committed prejudicial error in excluding
testimony from the Harrisons’ designed expert, surveyor Brad Bunker, offered to
rebut the methodology used by Mr. Blake in arriving at his conclusions. The jury
was thus presented with unrebutted expert testimony, based upon what appeared to
be a scientifically-prepared survey, illustrating what might or might not bear any
relationship whatever to the historic easement crossing the Harrisons’ property.
ARGUMENT
An easement is an interest in real property, typically created by express
conveyance or reservation. The exception is the creation of prescriptive easements
through adverse use. As prescriptive property interests are in derogation of
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individual property rights properly conveyed and held, they must meet specified
standards.
Elements of an easement by prescription must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence, as set forth in Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 16, 358
P.3d 346:
To establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must show, by clear
and convincing evidence . . . that its use of another’s land was open,
continuous and adverse under a claim of right for a period of 20
years . . . .
(Internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Buckley v. Cox, 247 P.2d 277,
279-80 (1952); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1998); Orton v.
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Utah 1998). Utah courts have outlined various
limitations on prescriptive use.
First, the use must continue uninterrupted, with the acquiescence of the
servient estate’s owner, for the entire prescriptive period. While use need not be
incessant, it must be continuous and acquiesced in for the entire period. Lunt v.
Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1953) (more fully discussed below).
Second, a permitted use (as opposed to an adverse use) may never ripen into
an easement. See Jacob, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 19, 358 P.3d 346; see also Valcarce,
961 P.2d at 311-12; Richens v. Struhs, 412 P.2d 314 (1966).
Finally, even if established, a prescriptive easement is limited in scope, and
may burden the servient estate only to the extent of its historic use for the 20-year
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prescriptive period; it cannot be expanded, widened or changed beyond the
limitations of historic use. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312 (“the general rule is that the
extent of a prescriptive easement is measured and limited by its historic use during
the prescriptive period”); McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978) (“It
has long been the law of this jurisdiction, and elsewhere that the extent of an
easement acquired by prescription is measured and limited by the use made during
the prescriptive period.”).
The trial court’s treatment of the Hollands’ prescriptive easement claim fell
short under the foregoing standards at three separate points during the case – once
on summary judgment, once in the skewing of expert testimony at trial, and finally
in the improper instruction of the jury concerning the scope of the claimed
easement. On each of these counts, the verdict and resulting judgment should be
reversed, and the case remanded either with instructions to find, as a matter of law,
that no prescriptive easement was established, or for retrial.
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY RULED ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THE HOLLANDS’ USE OF THE ROAD ACROSS THE
HARRISONS’ PROPERTY HAD BEEN CONTINUOUS
AND UNINTERRUPTED FOR A FULL 20 YEARS.
To begin with, the Hollands failed to present facts on summary judgment
establishing, as a matter of law, that they or their predecessors-in-interest had been
using the road across Harrisons’ property for 20 years. They claim to have
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established the date of the road’s creation as pre-dating their acquisition of the
property on August 9, 1996 (and their first visit thereto some days before),
observing that the road was already in place when they first visited, and apparently
not new.
At first blush, the existence of a road as of August 9, 1996 would seem to
satisfy (albeit by a matter of days) the 20-year prescriptive period requirement, as
this case was filed September 15, 2016. There is a clear problem, however, with
the trial court’s refusal to recognize conduct by the Harrisons that should be
deemed a revocation of acquiescence in the use of the road, and an interruption of
the prescriptive period. That the Harrisons’ conduct did not consist of physically
barring the road (which they needed for their own access) or filing a civil lawsuit
should not undermine the efforts they took to prevent the Hollands from using the
road.
Based on Page Holland’s account in the Sheriff’s Report, it is clear that in
June 2016, months before the 20-year period’s conclusion, Charlie Harrison and
Stan Holland had a confrontation on the property in which Mr. Harrison challenged
Mr. Holland’s use of the roadway. The confrontation went beyond simple verbal
notice; the dispute escalated between them to the point of calling in a law
enforcement officer. This June 2016 confrontation is not disputed: it is reflected in
a subsequent police report created in September that year, and sworn to by Page
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Holland. Moreover, the County Sheriff’s Report reflects a continuing course of
conduct between the parties beginning June 2016 and through September 2016,
which resulted in the Harrisons filing the present action.
Given the foregoing, there was a genuine issue of material fact on the issue
whether the Hollands’ prescriptive use of undetermined portions of the Harrisons’
property was not interrupted prior to the day of its 20th anniversary, which should,
at the very least, have defeated summary judgment. This is so for two reasons.
A.

The Harrisons’ conduct evidenced clear intent that they did not
acquiesce in the Hollands’ use of their property for the entire
prescriptive period.
The theoretical underpinnings of prescriptive rights in Utah were explained

in the case of Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535 (Utah 1953), which remains good law
in Utah. Therein, the Court considered whether there was “sufficient evidence of
[an] adverse user for a period of twenty years to sustain the trial court’s finding of
a prescriptive easement.” Id. at 537. In considering the question, the court stated
the following concerning the nature of prescriptive easement rights:
. . . [P]roof of continuous use for the prescriptive period, openly and
with knowledge of the landowner, was sufficient to raise a
presumption of grant, which in effect was a positive rule of law. The
fact that the grantor with knowledge of such use, makes no protest
against it is proof of his recognition of a claim of right in the grantee.
In other words, it is conclusively presumed from the landowner’s
acquiescence for the defined period of time in the other’s user of his
land, he having the right and power to stop such user, that it is a
rightful user.
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Id. at 537 (emphasis added). Lunt makes clear, in short, that prescriptive rights
arise from the acquiescence of the servient estate owner. More recently, in the
case of Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, 397 P.3d 686, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the establishment of adversity of use by the acquiescence of the servient
estate owner. See id. at ¶ 25.
Neither Lunt nor any of the cases handed down in Utah since that time have
clarified exactly what form of “protest” defeats the presumption of acquiescence
for purposes of easement by prescription; clearly, though, the trial court was of the
opinion that, short of the filing of a lawsuit or the physical blocking of a road and
courting violent confrontation, “acquiescence” could not be revoked. Other courts,
however, have considered this issue and have generally held that any conduct that
clearly manifests a revocation of acquiescence is sufficient.
In the case of Allen v. Thomas, 209 S.W.3d 475 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals considered a claim of easement by prescription,
inhering in the public, over a dirt road which the defendant claimed to be private.
In its ruling, the court of appeals considered, as a matter of first impression, what
conduct on a landowner’s part would interrupt the easement claimant’s use
sufficiently to end the prescriptive period. After a discussion of various cases from
other jurisdictions, the court then concluded the following:
. . . [G]iven that prescriptive easements – by their nature – are founded
on acquiescence . . . we find that clear conduct indicating that a
36
1493618.4

property owner is not acquiescing as to a prospective easement
owner’s claim of right should rightfully be considered as ending the
running of a prescriptive easement period. Moreover, we believe that
our decision here is consistent with our state’s long-held policy of
disfavoring prescriptive easements. We further conclude that it will
serve to discourage the type of violent confrontations that could result
from forcing a property owner to “successfully” defend his right to
keep others off of his land.
209 S.W.3d at 481 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Pittman v. Lowther, 610 S.E.2d 479 (S.C. 2005), the Supreme
Court of South Carolina concluded that “[i]n addition to physical barriers, verbal
threats which convey to the dominant landowner the impression the servient
landowner does not acquiesce in the use of land, are also sufficient to interrupt the
prescriptive period.” Id. at 481.
Next, in Kelley v. Westover, 938 S.W.2d 235 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997), the
Arkansas Court of Appeals held that “‘any unambiguous act of the owner of the
land which evinces his intention to exclude others from the uninterrupted use of the
right claimed breaks its continuity so as to prevent the acquisition of an easement
therein by prescription.” Id. at 236-37 (citing 25 Am. Jur.2d, Easements and
Licenses, § 69 (1996)).
In Rice v. Miller, 238 N.W.2d 609 (1976), the Minnesota Supreme Court
considered a landowner’s claim that the prescriptive rights of the easement
claimant had been interrupted before the end of the necessary prescriptive period.
Stating (as did the Utah Supreme Court in Lunt) that “‘[t]he very foundation of the
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establishment of a right to an easement by prescription is the acquiescence by the
owner of the servient tenement in the acts relied upon to establish such prescriptive
right’”, the Minnesota court explained that “‘[a]cquiescence, regardless of what it
might mean otherwise, means, when used in this connection, passive conduct on
the part of the owner of the servient estate [c]onsisting of failure on his part to
assert his paramount rights against the invasion thereof by the adverse user.” Id. at
611 (citations omitted). Based thereon, the court concluded that various verbal and
physical acts, by the landowner, defeated the prescriptive easement claim. Id. at
611-12.
The analysis taken by the courts in the foregoing cases is commendable.
Given the dependence of prescriptive rights on a landowner’s acquiescence in the
adverse use of his property, overt actions clearly evincing an intent to end that
acquiescence should be deemed sufficient to end the prescriptive period. The
alternative is a policy that compels landowners to engage in potentially-violent
confrontations, as a prerequisite to the defense of property rights – a “law of the
range” mentality which should not persist in Utah jurisprudence in the 21st
Century. In other areas of real property law, courts have long since channeled
parties away from self-help remedies (e.g., the prohibition against self-help in
repossessing demised premises rather than invoking unlawful detainer process, see,
e.g., Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985)).
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In sum, it is in the interests of modern-day common sense and civility that in
the face of a dispute over the use of real property, an individual may refer a dispute
to law enforcement, before either barricading a road or lawyering up.
As of June 2016, there could be no doubt that the Harrisons did not
acquiesce in the Hollands’ continued use of the Harrisons’ property as their
driveway. Law enforcement was contacted. To demand more of the Harrisons in
protection of their rights is to advocate a breach of the peace or to encourage the
very sort of costly and time-consuming litigation in which the parties now find
themselves.
B.

At a minimum, a fact question exists whether the parties’ invocation of
law enforcement intervention in June of 2016 constituted the initiation
of “legal proceedings,” sufficient to interrupt the Hollands’ claim of
prescriptive use.
Section 459 of the Restatement (First) of Property provides, in part, that

adverse use is uninterrupted with the aid of “legal proceedings.” While a Utah
court has not issued a decision directly on this point, even if this Court agrees that,
short of blocking a road physically and courting violence between neighbors, the
owner of real property must initiate “legal proceedings” to determine and proscribe
easement rights (see 4 Tiffany on Real Property (2017 ed.), § 1206 (“The weight of
authority is . . . that mere remonstrances or protests by the landowner will not
prevent the acquisition of a right by prescription, in the absence of any physical
interference with the user, or legal proceedings based thereon”)), there is no logical
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reason to limit the type of qualifying “legal proceedings” to the expensive and
lengthy processes of a full-blown civil action. Such a lofty standard would be
counterintuitive to the average landowner, who would understandably presume that
calling the police on a trespasser would be both an adequate, and the most
responsible, course of action.
Again, it is a matter of first impression in Utah whether the summoning law
enforcement should not be deemed a sufficient invocation of legal redress to
interrupt prescriptive use of private property. The Harrisons submit, though, that
where an unrepresented party invokes the intervention of law enforcement
officials, is advised to obtain legal counsel, attempts to negotiate a resolution, and
files a civil action (only when such attempts prove fruitless), “legal proceedings”
should be deemed to have been initiated – specifically, when law enforcement was
called. Certainly, the calling in of the county sheriff to investigate a claim of
unauthorized entry is just as effective to put the easement claimant on notice that
the landowner did not consent to the use as is the filing of a formal civil complaint
and service of a summons. In either instance, the landowner has invoked the
processes of law to place the easement claimant on notice that acquiescence is at
an end. (For that matter, physical obstruction of the easement, which all courts
recognize as interrupting a prescriptive use, conveys no more emphatic message of
non-acquiescence than does calling in the local law enforcement officers.)
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Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the trial
court’s finding of easement by prescription as a matter of law.
C.

The trial court should have balanced the equities of the relief sought –
specifically, the Hollands’ obligation to do equity before seeking equity.
It should be noted that the Hollands’ prescriptive easement claim was not

because of necessity; the Hollands are not landlocked and can build their own road
to their home. But instead, they claimed that they had the right to use the
Harrisons’ property as their private driveway and – despite being warned and
despite the visit by the sheriff in June of 2016 – continued to trespass across the
property while the Harrisons were in the process of retaining legal counsel in an
attempt to resolve this matter (without resorting to litigation). In so doing, the
Hollands managed to avoid an actual civil filing until a few days past the 20th
anniversary of their first visit to their lot.
This is a suit in equity and those who seek equity must do equity. The
Hollands were on notice, by June of 2016, that they were not welcome to cross the
Harrison property. They knew this. They should not have been permitted to use
their disregard of that intelligence as a sword to establish prescriptive rights.
Moreover, the trial court should have balanced the equities, determined whether
the Hollands, seeking equity, have done equity, and reserved the matter for trial.
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POINT II: ANY USE OF THE ROAD WAS PERMISSIVE.
As already noted, claims of prescriptive easement must be based on adverse
use. If the other elements of easement by prescription are met, there is an initial
presumption that the use of the easement was adverse; however, proof offered by
the owner of the servient estate that use was by permission defeats the prescriptive
easement claim. Where the use is shown to be “under” the owner, rather than
“against” the owner, Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P.2d 714, 715 (1946), no prescriptive
use is made out. Notably (and contrary to the trial court’s presumption in this case,
see below), if the owner of the servient estate demonstrates that the use was
initially permissive, the use remains permissive, and no prescriptive right matures
unless it is thereafter converted to an adverse use. As soon as permissive use is
shown, the burden shifts back to the claimant to show that the use became adverse,
and continued so for the prescriptive period:
If the owner of the servient estate “sustains that burden and
overcomes the presumption by proof that the use was initially
permissive, then the burden of going forward with evidence and of
ultimate persuasion shifts back to the claimant to show that the use
[again] became adverse and continued for the prescriptive period.”
Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT App 206, ¶ 19, 358 P.3d 346 (citing Richens v. Struhs, 412
P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1966)); see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311312 (Utah 1998); see also Bruce and Ely, The Law of Easements and Licenses in
Land (2018 ed.) at § 5:9, p. 5-45 (“When use of a servient estate is initially
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permissive, the use will confer a prescriptive right only if the user subsequently
makes a direct assertion of a claim hostile to the owner.”).
In support of cross motions for summary judgment, the Harrisons relied on
the declaration testimony of Janice Hawley, the owner of the Willow Basin
Subdivision from before the time of its creation in 1994 and the Harrisons’
predecessor-in-interest in the Harrison’ property. Hawley Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7 (R. 30910.) Her sworn statement was that, at the time she conveyed the Hollands’ parcel
to Manuel and Ginger Torres (the Hollands’ predecessors-in-interest), she gave
permission for use of the roadway across the Harrison parcel (title to which she
retained until its conveyance to the Harrisons in 2008) for the limited purpose of
permitting the Torreses to access the neighboring parcel for marketing purposes.
Hawley Decl., ¶¶ 8-9, (R. 310). Her intent was always that permanent access to all
parcels of the subdivision be via roads reflected on the plat. Hawley Decl., ¶¶ 5, 9
(R. 310). The use of the road across the Harrison property, in other words, was
permissive during her ownership of that parcel, for the use specified. This was
likewise Mr. Day’s understanding, both in deposition and at trial. The Hollands
made no showing whatsoever of a point in time at which their permitted use of a
limited temporary access road became adverse, as required by governing case law.
The trial court, however, completely disregarded this failing, concluding as a
matter of law on summary judgment that the change of ownership of the Holland

43
1493618.4

property automatically converted the use of the road to an adverse use, without any
other showing. On that same basis, the trial court refused Harrisons’ proffered
instruction on permissive use. Proposed Jury Instruction No. 32 (R. 931).9
Remarkably, the trial court’s position in this regard was supported by no citation of
any authority either by the court or by the Hollands, in derogation of the legal
standard established by Jacob, Richens and Valcarce. The law, in fact, is precisely
the opposite: only the transfer of the servient estate extinguishes the permissive use
and renders it adverse. See generally Bruce & Ely, The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land (2018 ed.) at § 5:9, p. 5-46, and cases cited therein.10
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY
THAT THE SCOPE OF THE EASEMENT WHICH IT
HAD DECLARED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
LIMITED TO ITS HISTORIC USE.
Where an easement by prescription is determined to exist, its location and
scope are established and limited by one thing only: the nature and scope of the
historic use made thereof by the claimant. The governing standard was articulated
by the Utah Supreme Court in the 1943 decision of Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d
696 (Utah 1943): “[A] prescriptive right would be limited by the nature and extent

9

Each party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of
the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it; if a rational jury
could find a factual basis in the evidence to support the theory, the trial court is obligated
to give the instruction. State v. Campos, 2013 UT App 213, ¶ 29, 309 P.3d 1160.
10
Apparently, only Maryland follows the rule stated by the trial court herein. Rupli v.
South Mtn. Heritage Soc., Inc., 202 Md. App. 673, 33 A.3d 1055 (2011).
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of use during the prescriptive period.” Id. at 701. In Harvey v. Haights Bench
Irrigation Co., 318 P.2d 343 (Utah 1957), Utah Supreme Court expanded on and
explained the reason for the “historic use” limitation:
In determining the nature of this prescriptive easement, its extent and
limitations, the burdens and benefits which it confers upon each
estate, we must look to the nature of the use which existed during the
prescriptive period. Since the right has its inception in the use during
that time, its extent and limitations, its burdens and benefits are
determined by the nature of that use and the understandings of the
parties thereto. Thus any use which would have probably been
interrupted by the owner of the servient estate had the owner of the
dominant estate attempted such use prior to the expiration of the
prescriptive period, is a use which places a greater burden on the
servient estate and therefore is beyond the prescriptive right acquired
by the dominant estate.
318 P.2d 349 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). In 1998, the Utah Supreme
Court reaffirmed the “historic use” limitation on prescriptive easements in
Valcarce, 961 P.2d 305, supra:
The general rule is that the extent of a prescriptive easement is
measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive
period.
Id. at 312 (emphasis added). On March 30, 2017, the Utah Court of Appeals once
again reaffirmed the “historic use” limitation, and gave an extensive explanation
thereof. In Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, 397 P.3d 686, the Court of Appeals
took up a lower court judgment granting prescriptive easement rights over a
neighboring property for use of ingress, egress and parking. In reversing (in part)
the lower court’s ruling, the Court noted that the prescriptive easement is a “non45
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possessory interest” which may not be applied to divest the landowner of
ownership rights in the underlying property:
An easement is an incorporeal right. . . . It is a property interest that
consists of the privilege to merely use—rather than occupy or
possess—the land of another for a circumscribed, limited purpose. . . .
“A prescriptive easement does not result in ownership, but allows
only use of property belonging to another for a limited purpose, one
that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the
owner. . . .
As a result, a successful prescriptive easement claimant does not (and,
in fact, cannot) gain the right to occupy or possess the landowner's
property. Indeed, the claimed right to use may not be inconsistent
with either the [landowner's] ownership interest or the general
property right of the owner, or the general use of the property by the
owner . . . Rather, the rights of the easement holder and the landowner
must be capable of being balanced so as to afford each the ability to
“use and enjoy” the rights attendant to use the property for a limited
purpose on the one hand and ownership on the other.
Id. at ¶¶ 41-42 (internal quotations omitted). The Court then reaffirmed the general
rule that by reason of the foregoing, “the extent of a prescriptive easement is
measured and limited by its historic use during the prescriptive period,” and adding
that “[t]he easement holder may not be granted a right ‘which places a greater
burden on the [landowner]’” than during the prescriptive period. Id. at ¶ 58 (citing
Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312). Based thereon, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s findings and order as they related to the widths of the claimants’
prescriptive rights, holding that “these orders are inconsistent with the usage that
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forms the basis of the Judd’s prescriptive right—using the Driveway for ingress
and egress purposes.” Id. at ¶ 65.
In this case, it was established both on dispositive motions and at trial that,
20 years before this action started, the road across the Harrison property was a
single blade, or 8 feet, in width. No competent evidence of any sort was offered of
its original course. By the Hollands’ own evidence, neither the width nor the
course of the road changed until after 2008, when the Harrisons acquired their
property. As such, governing case law should have limited the Hollands’ remedy
to an 8-foot-wide easement (assuming the Hollands managed to establish the
location thereof, which they did not, as explained in Points IV and V below).
Yet, the court disregarded the Harrisons’ proffered instruction regarding the
historic use of prescriptive easements, substituting therefor a broad and vague
instruction that, if once a prescriptive easement had been found (which, in this
case, had been done on summary judgment), the jury was at liberty to decide
where, and how large, such an easement should be, given the “reasonable” needs
of the dominant estate holders:
You should determine what is reasonably necessary, from the facts
and circumstances of this case, for SPAH and the Hollands to access
their property, taking into account the historic use and shape of the
roadway during its 20 years of use. You may express your decision in
terms of the survey, or by determining the width of the easement.
Instruction No. 27 (R. 1085) (emphasis added).
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Instruction No. 27 did not accurately state the law. It imposed a much
vaguer, more flexible standard than that permitted by governing cases. It also used
the words “reasonably necessary,” a standard unsupported by and contrary to law.
As a direct and clear result, the jury determined that the Hollands’
prescriptive rights encumbered the Harrison property to the extent of a full 40-foot
width, as “this will be consistent with other easements in subdivision.” The jury
was impermissibly given the leeway to impose what it saw as a simple and
evenhanded, “reasonable” resolution to the whole case: since all the other
easements in Willow Basin Subdivision (even though they had been established by
the developer as access roads, and had been given by express grant) were 40 feet
in width, so should the road across Harrisons’ property be 40 feet in width. But
governing law does not permit the jury to impose such a standard. The court’s
instruction misled them into believing it to be a viable solution – a result that the
court sought.
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED
EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM THE HOLLANDS’
SURVEYOR, LUCAS BLAKE.
Before trial began, Harrisons challenged the methodology of Hollands’
retained expert surveyor, Lucas Blake, on a motion in limine. (R. 690-700). The
Harrisons based their motion on the Deposition of Lucas Blake (“Blake Depo”):
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a.

Mr. Blake was first contacted by the Hollands in the summer of

2016.11 Blake Depo at 25:1-6 (R. 717). Prior to that time, he had never seen
or visited the parties’ respective properties, and had no knowledge thereof.
Blake Depo at 26:19-25; 28:5-16 (R. 717).
b.

Mr. Blake visited the property only once, in the company of

Defendant Page Holland, within a month or so of his first being contacted.
Blake Depo at 28:18-20 (R. 717).
c.

During his single visit to the property in the summer of 2016,

Mr. Blake conducted measurements from the edge of the road as it then
existed. Blake Depo at 29:19-30; 19 (R. 718, 715). He then estimated the
centerline of the existing road as of 2016 (by “eyeballing”). Blake Depo
at 31:7-14, 32:2-7 (R. 718).
d.

Mr. Blake did no other research in connection with his

anticipated testimony. Blake Depo at 34:6-16 (R. 719). He later confirmed
that he had performed no other investigation, research or examination

11

As noted, Charlie Harrison filed a lawsuit in 2014, styled: Harrison v. Kratz, et al.,
Case No. 140700031. See supra n. 8. Lucas Blake was initially a named defendant in
this action. See Case No. 140700031, Docket & Complaint. Then, after he was
dismissed from the lawsuit, he was deposed on May 29, 2015. See Case No. 140700031,
Amended Notice of Deposition. It is therefore no surprise that Mr. Blake was the
Hollands’ expert witness: His survey in the summer of 2016 was against the backdrop of
litigation between him and Mr. Harrison.
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concerning the location, scope, course, or dimensions of the easement before
the summer of 2016:
Q. All right. Other than the one visit to the property when you
took the measurements you have described, did you do any other
examination, research or data gathering to prepare Exhibit 40? . . .
A. Oh. No.
Blake Depo at 34:1-16 (R. 719).
e.

In follow-up questioning, Mr. Blake reaffirmed that his

knowledge and work related to the layout of the road in the summer of 2016,
and that he had no information, direct or indirect, concerning its location,
course or scope at any time prior thereto:
Q. Okay. So it would be fair to say that Exhibit 40 and
Exhibit 41, the first page of Exhibit 41, both illustrate the road as it
existed in the summer of 2016?
A. Correct.
Q. And, again, you’d never been to the property before the
summer of 2016?
A. Correct.
Q. So you don’t know what was there before that?
A. No.
Blake Depo at 37:18-38:3 (R. 720).
f.

Mr. Blake further admitted that his survey work measured only

the flat of the road, and included no tap or toe of any slopes. Blake Depo at
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40:10-19 (R. 720). He had no idea when the road was graded to the
condition in which he surveyed it. Blake Depo at 41:6-9 (R. 721).
g.

Toward the conclusion of his deposition, Mr. Blake was offered,

and accepted as correct, the following summary of his testimony:
Q. Okay. So let’s back up, then. You went to the property in the
summer of 2016, you took your measurements, you looked at the
Keogh land survey on file with the county of the subdivision that
this is in, and you prepared the legal description which is the
second page of Exhibit 41. Did you then deliver that to the
Hollands?
A. Through email, yeah.
Blake Depo at 36:1-8 (R. 719).
The trial court denied the motion in a brief and intemperate memorandum
decision. (R. 839.) The lower court’s ruling in this regard mirrored its
misperception of the scope and location of an easement established by prescription,
and permitted expert testimony on the estimated centerline of the road crossing the
Harrison property in 2016 – not the road that existed in 1996. In carrying out its
role as gatekeeper for expert testimony, the trial court should have excluded
Mr. Blake’s testimony entirely.
Before a designated expert witness can present opinion evidence to a jury,
there must be a threshold showing to the court (as “gatekeeper”) that the proposed
expert opinion testimony reliably assists the trier of fact to determine the ultimate
issue in controversy:
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Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the
principles or methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
Rule 702(b), Utah R. Evid. Rule 702(b), revised in 2011 to clarify prior confusion
under the rule and interpretive case law, presently requires not only that the expert
be competent, that his methods be recognized or otherwise shown reliable, and that
his methodology be sound, but that the theory and methodology be properly
applied to the facts of the case. Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
Railroad, 2001 UT 77, ¶ 19, 31 P.3d 557.
The Harrisons did not challenge Mr. Blake’s credentials as a land surveyor;
nor did they contend that his survey methodology was flawed or incorrectly
performed when he visited the properties at issue in this case in the summer of
2016. Instead, the Harrisons contended that Mr. Blake measured the wrong thing.
The issue reserved for trial by the trial court’s summary judgment ruling was the
scope and extent of an easement created by 20 years’ uninterrupted and adverse
use, not a roadway more recently configured by the Harrisons. As such,
Mr. Blake’s methodology was incorrectly applied to the facts of the case and
should not have been admitted under Rule 702(b).
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As noted under Point III, above, even when established, a prescriptive right
may not morph into something more than time and use have established. At trial,
the Hollands (as claimants of prescriptive rights across the Harrison property) bore
the burden of proving this issue by clear and convincing evidence as to each
element of the claim. Judd v. Bowen, 2017 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 397 P.3d 686.
The expert testimony of Lucas Blake made no pretense of establishing the
historic, 20-year-long use of the easement claimed by the Hollands. Instead, he
measured the scope and centerline (which he “eyeballed” from the edges of the
then-existing road in 2016) based on observations and measurements taken long
after the claimed prescriptive period had started – in fact, at approximately the time
this lawsuit was initiated. By his own admission, Mr. Blake consulted no county
records other than the subdivision plat map on record with the county recorder’s
office. He reviewed no historic aerial photographs. He consulted no prior surveys
of the property. He interviewed no residents or owners concerning the changes in
the road over time. He made no attempt to adjust his measurements based on
representations or evidence from any source concerning the original scope and
course of the roadway. As such, Mr. Blake’s survey work had no bearing on the
facts of the case to be determined by the jury.
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Mr. Blake’s expert opinion on the 2016 configuration of the Hollands’
claimed prescriptive easement was also irrelevant. Rule 401, Utah R. Evid.,
provides the following:
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make any fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
For those reasons set out above, the location of the road in 2016 is of no
consequence in determining the scope of a prescriptive right which, by law, must
have ripened (if at all) during a 20-year period preceding the filing of this lawsuit.
Mr. Blake’s testimony did not speak to this issue at all; he had nothing to offer the
trier of fact.
Yet the trial court permitted his testimony (and permitted its presentation to
the jury unrebutted, as explained below in Point V). As such, the jury was
presented with unanswered testimony regarding the location of the easement’s
supposed historic centerline, which they clearly took as gospel. Rule 403, Utah R.
Evid., provides that:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
The jury was presented with an illustration from a certified land surveyor showing
the scope and course of an easement (albeit as modified during the course of the
54
1493618.4

prescriptive period, and not measured until 2016) and was thereafter instructed to
determine the scope and course of that easement (see supra Point III). The jury’s
response to the verdict form evinces the resulting confusion: the jurors clearly
misunderstood the determination that they were called upon to make. Visuals of
any sort, and certainly those from a licensed land surveyor – backed up with
unrebutted foundational testimony regarding measurements and methods –
unquestionably carry powerful and disproportionate weight with a jury. The jury
clearly deemed Mr. Lucas’ drawing as determinative of the easement’s centerline
and course even though the fact that they were to determine (the historic location
and extent of any prescriptive use) was nowhere shown to them.
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY FROM BRAD BUNKER,
HARRISONS’ RETAINED EXPERT.
Having erroneously determined that Mr. Blake’s testimony was admissible
and relevant, the trial court compounded its error by excluding rebuttal testimony
from the Harrisons’ retained expert, Brad Bunker. Mr. Bunker was prepared to
address, as a qualified land surveyor whose credentials matched Mr. Blake’s own,
why Mr. Blake’s approach to establishing the centerline of the supposed
prescriptive easement was flawed, in that he had consulted no historic records to
determine its location, but had measured backward by “eyeballing” the centerline
of the road which he found on the property in 2016. Without explanation, the trial
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court concluded that, while Mr. Blake’s testimony concerning the location of the
easement’s centerline and scope was entirely proper, Mr. Bunker’s proffered
testimony (which simply challenged Mr. Blake’s methodology) would impinge
upon the role of the court in establishing the elements of prescriptive easement.
This was simply not the case. The trial court had permitted Mr. Blake to present
forensic testimony concerning the location and course of a prescriptive easement; it
should likewise have permitted the Harrisons to present expert testimony
challenging the legitimacy and reliability of Mr. Blake’s methodology. That
rebuttal expert testimony is presumed admissible when an expert has testified in
the opposing party’s case-in-chief, see Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah
1993).
CONCLUSION
A review of the record as a whole in this matter presents an inescapable
conclusion: the trial court prejudged the case. It determined that the Hollands
were to have a prescriptive easement across the Harrisons’ property, which would
consist of the road as it existed in 2016 and thereafter. To this end, the court:
(1) improperly granted summary judgment as to the existence of an
easement by prescription;
(2) displayed a decidedly hostile animus toward the Harrisons in their
attempts to dispute this ruling;
(3) improperly admitted expert testimony establishing the location and scope
of the easement as the court plainly wished it found;
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(4) displayed an equally hostile animus toward the Harrisons in their
attempts to dispute the admissibility of the expert testimony as to the single
issue remaining;
(5) improperly excluded rebuttal testimony challenging the survey methods
used; and
(6) improperly instructed the jury as to the law applicable to the sole
determination entrusted to them: the scope and location of the easement.
As a result, the jury returned a verdict saddling the Harrison property with a
40-foot wide easement servicing the Holland property—an easement which has
never existed on that property, and certainly did not exist for the entire 20 years
preceding this case’s filing.
In fact, the Harrisons timely challenged the Hollands’ continued trespass
onto the Harrison property for any purpose by notifying Hollands that Harrisons
did not acquiescence in that use and calling the Grand County Sheriff’s office to
remedy the situation. Prior to the Harrisons’ acquisition of their property in 2008,
moreover, the prior owner thereof, Janice Hawley, was allowing the Hollands’ use
(like that of their predecessors-in-interest) by express permission. Even if an
easement did exist, moreover, its scope was limited to the 20-year use: an 8-footwide, single-blade roadway. At no point in the trial did the Hollands – who bore
the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence – establish the location or
course of that path at all.
Based on the foregoing, the Harrisons request that the court’s ruling on the
Hollands’ prescriptive easement claim be reserved and, in the alternative,
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remanded to the trial court for retrial on all issues relevant to the Hollands’ claim
of easement by prescription.
DATED this 15th day of February 2019.
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